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One of the most signiﬁcant difﬁculty in Wireless Sensors Network (WSN) is the development of an effective to-
pology control method that can support the quality of the network, respect the limited memory and at the same
time increase the lifetime of the network. This paper introduces a new approach by mixing a non-cooperative
Game Theory technique with a decentralized clustering algorithm to address the problem of maximizing the
network lifetime. More precisely, this approach uses Game Theory techniques to control the activities of a sensor
node and its neighbors to limit the number of the forwarding messages and to maximize the lifetime of the
sensor's battery. In other words, the approach will decrease the energy consumed by the WSN by decreasing the
number of forwarded packets and improve the network lifetime by harvesting energy from the environment. The
simulations results show that the performances in terms of energy saving and increasing the number of data
packets received by base station outperforms those with distributed based clustering algorithms without GT, such
as low energy and location based clustering LELC and LEACH algorithms.1. Introduction
The WSN has required an important attentiveness in these years. It is
implicated widely in different domains, such as health care, ecosystem
monitoring, environmental assessing, target tracking, maintaining con-
trol, and urban areas applications (Alemdar and Ersoy, 2010; Fernan-
dez-Lozano et al., 2015; Muduli et al., 2018). The major activities of a
sensor node are capturing the data information in its urban environment,
aggregate it and forward it to reach the sink using routing protocols.
Moreover, the ﬁnite batteries capacity implies a limited lifetime of the
sensor nodes and their applications. For this problem, several solution
techniques have been proposed to prolong the network lifetime. Some of
these solutions are based on topology control, routing protocols, data
aggregation, forecasting approaches and others (Yalgashev et al., 2016;
Atto and Guy, 2015; Aziz et al., 2013; Syarif et al., 2017; Fasolo et al.,
2007). The main tasks of our study is to extend the network lifetime by
decreasing the wasted energy during the sensor node activities, and
compensate the loss of energy by harvesting environmental energy in the
sleeping mode. Our proposed method is based on a non-cooperative
MGET in a clustering hierarchical structure. This approach is divided
in two phases. The ﬁrst one consists to select dynamically the clusters and
their clusters heads based on sensors energy and location (Ullah et al.,, jaafar.gaber@utbm.fr (J. Gaber
July 2018; Accepted 7 Septemb
.2018). In the second phase, the sensor node aggregates the sensing
messages by a compression method to save sensor's energy and memory
and decided to stay out of the communication to charge its battery in the
sleeping mode or to enter the market game and send the message to its
neighbors. The suitable decision of the sensor node depends on the
probability obtained by maximizing its utility.
In this paper, the rest main contributions are structured as follows:
Section Ⅱ presents the categories of clustering protocols. In addition,
it shows the different types of the GTs, their applications in WSN and the
GT principle. In section Ⅲ, we explain the energy consumed by the
different activities of an arbitrary sensor node and the model of sensor's
rechargeable battery. In section Ⅳ, we adapt a non-cooperative game
theory in a decentralized clustering protocol to prolong theWSN lifetime,
decrease the wasted energy in the network and increase the number of
data information arrived to the BS. The simulation results are presented
and investigated in Ⅴ. Finally, we conclude the paper in section Ⅵ.
2. Related work
2.1. Clustering
Clustering protocols are one of the effective techniques of), pascal.lorenz@uha.fr (P. Lorenz).
er 2018
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Election of cluster heads (CHs) play a signiﬁcant role in energy con-
sumption management (Lloret et al., 2009). Clustering protocols can be
categorized in two classes: Centralized (Muruganathan et al., 2005) and
distributed clustering algorithms (Bukhari et al., 2017).
2.1.1. Centralized clustering
In centralized clustering, the BS is the organizer to form clusters. At
the start of each round, sensors nodes have to transmit their location
information and energy status to the BS. The BS will collect all infor-
mation from all the sensors nodes in the network, select Cluster Heads
(CH), and form clusters. This type of clustering is not a very suitable way
to do clustering for a large number of sensors or large network wide.
For example, BCDCP (Base-Station Controlled Dynamic Clustering
Protocol) is a centralized clustering protocol with a unique BS that is
capable of complex computation, the CHs are selected by the BS
randomly and all the routes and paths for transmission and reception of
data information are selected by the BS (Mehta et al., 2015). Each node
needs to transmit data messages regarding its location and residual en-
ergy to the BS during the formation of clusters. Therefore, BCDCP in-
creases the design complexity and the energy consumption of the nodes
in the large-range networks. BCSP (Base station Centralized Simple
Clustering Protocol) is a protocol where in the BS does not collect any
information about location of the sensor nods but utilizes information
about remaining energy of each sensor node and the number of CHs
depending on the circumstance of the sensor network (Jan et al., 2013).
Each node should send its current energy information along with the
sensing information, increasing the overhead. The drawback of this
protocol is that due to its centralized implementation, it is not so
appropriate for sensor networks with a large number of nodes. In addi-
tion, without any location information, BCSP cannot guarantee a uniform
distribution of CHs nodes and their clusters.
2.1.2. Distributed clustering
Distributed clustering techniques eliminate the need of a centralized
station to create CHs and clusters. The low energy and hierarchical
structure models are generally used to create clusters and select CHs in
two levels. At the ﬁrst level, there is a selection of CHs and at the second
level, the data messages are transferred by sensor nodes to BS via CHs. BS
just receives messages and does not control the creation of clusters.
EEMDC (Energy Efﬁcient Multi level and Distance aware Clustering) is
that extends the WSN lifetime while providing more stability and reli-
ability to the network (Mehmood et al., 2015). This routing protocol
splits the network area into three logical layers. After the partition of the
network area, the hotspot problem is ﬁxed, the distance between the
nodes and the CH and between the CH and the BS are taken into account
when considering the hop-count value of the nodes. In addition, CHs are
elected by acquiring the average leftover energy of the nodes, and the
data messages are delivered to the BS using the shortest distance path to
the BS. ICCBP (Inter Cluster Chain Based Protocol) is a new clustering
algorithm that uses multi-hop and intra-cluster communication with
updating CHs when the existing CHs dissipate their energy (Rani et al.,
2017). In (Mittal et al., 2017), a new structure to construct clusters and
establish connections between sensors is proposed. In this protocol, the
distance between CHs depends on a threshold calculated by the signal
message transmission to insure the connections between clusters. In
addition, this protocol creates a virtual wireless sensor networks. LEACH
(Low-Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy) protocol is one of the most
popular decentralized clustering protocol based on the homogeneous
WSNs (Xiangning and Yulin, 2007). LEACH is a dynamic clustering
method that update clusters and head clusters (CH) each round. Each
round starts with a setup phase and ﬁnishes with steady state. In the
setup phase, it rotates the CHs role among all sensor nodes to expend
energy uniformly. Each sensor will pick a random number between 0 and
1. If this number is less than a threshold, TðnÞ that will be deﬁned, the
sensor node becomes a CH for the current round. The threshold is set as81follows:
TðnÞ ¼
8><
>:
p
1 p

r  mod 1
p
 for n 2 G
0 Otherwise
(1)
where p is the cluster head probability in the network, r is the current
round of election and G is the set of nodes that were not cluster head in
the last round. In this paper, we use the clustering approach based on
LEACH protocol with strategy based on location and residual energy of a
sensor node to select the CHs (Kassan et al., 2018).2.2. Game theory
The Game Theory (GT) is extensively applied in economics to maxi-
mize the outcomes by using the mathematical models such as the stra-
tegic game theory for the differential information economy which
players suggest net trades and prices (Fugarolas-Alvarez-Ude et al.,
2009). In the recent years, GT is increasingly applied inWSN for different
objectives, such as communication security, energy efﬁciency, control
power transmission, data collection and pursuit evasion (Shen et al.,
2017; Alskaif et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2012). In this section, we review the
GT used to enhance the energy conservation and extend the network
lifetime. The GT can be classiﬁed in two top main categories: cooperative
and non-cooperative games.
2.2.1. Cooperative game theory based approach
To decrease the energy consumed in the network, some sensor nodes
cooperate to form coalitions. The coalitional game is considered as one of
the most signiﬁcant type of cooperative game theory. In (Wu et al.,
2012), a power control game theoretic model is proposed to optimize the
trade-off between energy consumption, and data packets transmission
performance. It takes in consideration the individual utility of each
sensor player. A novel approach is proposed in (Jonnalagadda and
Kuppusamy, 2018) to identify the overlapping community form in social
networks. This approach is based on the shapely values mechanism. It
activates with a weight function to ﬁnd the stable coalitions of under-
lying community form of the network. The shapely values and the weight
function are updated by the community detection algorithm using the
local information. Another type of cooperative game is the bargaining
game theory. To achieve the two opposite objectives, which are pro-
longing the WSN lifetime and maintaining the quality of the sensors
activities in parallel, a Kalai-Smordinsky Bargaining Solution is used to
ﬁnd the best distribution among coalition members in (Truong et al.,
2010).
2.2.2. Non-cooperative game theory based approach
For the non-cooperative game theory, sensor nodes react selﬁshly to
preserve their residual energy by refusing to receipt a data information
and forward it in multi-hop network. The optimal responses for energy
efﬁcient non-cooperative game theoretic are obtained when each sensor
player improves its strategy to maximize its utility, given the strategies of
other sensors players. In (Sengupta et al., 2010), a non-cooperative game
theory model is proposed to control the transmit power levels and the
Nash Equilibrium solution exists and attained according to the channel
condition and power level. In addition, a non-cooperative game theory is
used in the election of the CHs for the clustering model in (Yang et al.,
2017). In this game model, the sensor node decides to declare itself as a
CH or not by calculating the optimal probability in the mixed strategy
that depends on the maximizing of its payoff.
In addition to the non-cooperative and cooperative game theories, the
repeated game theory is involved with a class of active games, in which a
game is played for several times and the players have the ability to spot
the result of the preceding game before attending the upcoming repeti-
tion (Hoang et al., 2015). In (Kim, 2018), a control scheme based on
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model to provide a packet-forwarding mechanism for underwater wire-
less sensors network and reduces the energy consumption.
In this paper, we propose a non-cooperative repeated game theory.
Mostly, a game theory consists of a set of players, a set of strategies for
each player and a set of corresponding utility functions. For a WSN, the
sensors are the players, G is a particular game, where N ¼ fSð1Þ; Sð2Þ;
…; SðPÞg is a ﬁnite set of the sensor nodes. X ¼ fxð1Þ; xð2Þ; :::; xðPÞg is
the vector representation of the strategies taken by the sensors. U ¼
fUðxð1Þ; Uðxð2Þ; …; UðxðPÞg is the corresponding utility function of
node j represented by Uj, Uj ðj ¼ 1; 2; …; PÞ, corresponds to the utility
value of each node. This value is obtained at the end of the decision taken
by the sensor node SðjÞ. A strategy for a player is a whole organization of
decisions in all possible states in the game. The players; sensors effort to
act selﬁshly to maximize their consequences agreeing to their prefer-
ences. We have to formulate the utility functions in a way that will help
node SðjÞ to select a strategy that characterizes the best response to its
strategies. Every different mixture of individual decisions of strategies
can produce a different strategy proﬁle. For a non-cooperative repeated
game theory, the solution concept involving N players is obtained when
each player has made the best response against the others players deci-
sion of probabilities. This solution is named mixed strategy Nash Equi-
librium.
3. Energy model
3.1. Energy consumption model for a sensor
The energy cost for a sensor depends on the energy consumed to
achieve its activities. In this section, we present the different factors that
play a main role in the consumption of energy. To determinate the re-
sidual energy of a node, it is required to ﬁnd the total energy consump-
tion of a node in the operating of one data packet information. The
notations utilized for the factors causing energy consumption by a sensor
node are described in Table 1.
3.1.1. Sensing energy consumption
The sensing energy cost depends on the type of sensors. For example,
the temperature sensors consumed less important energy than gas sen-
sors. The sensor node can contain diverse sensors, and each one has its
individual energy consumption attributes. Generally, the sensing energy
consumption for a Si can be expressed as follows:
ES ¼ LðSiÞ  Vdc  IðSiÞ  TðSiÞ (2)
where IðSiÞ is the needed amount of current, and TðSiÞ is the duration to
detect and collect LðSiÞ bits data information.
3.1.2. Processing energy consumption
The sensor consumes energy to read the data message and to write it
in its memory. The processing energy consumption could be calculated
by (Pati et al., 2017):Table 1
Notations deﬁnition.
Notations Deﬁnition
n Number of sensor nodes in the network
Si Sensor node where i ¼ f1; 2;…;ng
ES Sensing energy cost
EP Processing energy cost
ET Transmitting energy cost
ER Receiving energy cost
ESwitchRadio Switching state energy cost in the radio
ESwitchMCU Switching mode energy cost in the MicroController Unit (MCU)
Vdc Voltage supply
C Total energy consumption
LðSiÞ Number of bits information
82EP ¼ LðSiÞ  Vdc8  ðIWrite  TWrite þ IRead  TReadÞ (3)where IWrite and IRead are the necessary amount current to write and read
one byte data. TWrite and TRead are the necessary duration to treat the LðSiÞ
data information.
3.1.3. Communicating energy consumption
The energy consumed to transmit and receive LðSiÞ is computed
following the ﬁrst-order wireless communication model for the radio
hardware illustrated in Fig. 1 (Heinzelman et al., 2000).
Transmitter expends energy to run the radio electronics and the
power ampliﬁer. The necessary energy required to transmit LðSiÞ bits
data message is:
ETi ¼

LðSi Þ  Eelec þ LðSi Þ  Efs  d2 when d < d0
LðSi Þ  Eelec þ LðSi Þ  Emp  d4 when d > d0 (4)
where Eelec represents the energy consumed to transmit or receive 1 bit
messag, the constants Efs and Emp depend on the transmitter ampliﬁer
model. Efs is for the free space model, Emp is for multipath model, d is the
transmitter receiver distance and d0 is a threshold distance calculated as
follows:
d0 ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Efs

Emp
q
(5)
And the energy consumed by the radio to receive LðSiÞ bits data in-
formation is deﬁned by:
ERi ¼ LðSiÞ  Eelec (6)
3.1.4. Switching radio sensor state energy consumption
The sensor dissipates a signiﬁcant amount of energy to change from a
state (i.e., sensing, processing, transmitting and receiving) i to another j.
For the switching states in the radio, the wasted energy can be deter-
mined as:
ESwitchRadio ¼ Vdc2 

Istj  Isti
 Tsti;j (7)
where Istj is the current draw of the radio in the state switched to, and Isti
is the current draw of the radio in the current state and Tsti;j is the
necessary time for the radio to switch from state i to j.
3.1.5. Switching the microcontroller (MCU) mode energy consumption
The sensor wastes energy by switching between the MCU modes. In
this paper, we just take in consideration the active mode and the sleeoing
mode. This wasted energy is negligible compared to switching radio
energy consumption. The energy cost for the computational MCU mode
can be expressed as:Fig. 1. First order radio energy model.
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The total energy consumed by each sensor C is deﬁned as follows:
C ¼ ES þ EP þ ETi þ ERi þ ESwitchRadio þ ESwitchMCU (9)
3.2. Rechargeable battery model
The applications of the sensor node are limited by the availability of
the power stored in its battery. If the sensor node expends all its energy, it
is considered as dead. Moreover, it disturbs the dispatching of the in-
formation data to reach the sink. In view of the fact that the replacing of
the sensor's battery by a new one and the redeployment of the sensors are
very costly, it is not appropriate to change the sensor's battery. To
overcome these problems, the sensors nodes can use energy harvesting
supplies to recharge their batteries. However, the utilization of renew-
able energy depends on the network environmental conditions as solar,
wind, hydrogen, and hybrid sources (Knight et al., 2008). In this article,
we considered that the sensor's battery can be recharged from the envi-
ronment (see Fig. 2).
4. The proposed approach: game theory within clustering
algorithm for WSN
The distributed clustering algorithm uses round as unit, each round is
made up of set-up phase and steady phase for the purpose of reducing
unnecessary energy costs. Set-up phase is for the building of the clusters
and the election of the CHs and steady phase is for the sensor's states (see
Fig. 3).
4.1. Set-up phase
It concerns the formation of the clusters and their heads for each
round using sensor location and individual energy consumption (Kassan
et al., 2018). Two CHs cannot be in the same cluster. For this reason, the
distance between CHs should be bigger than a threshold distance. The
remaining energy level in each sensor node plays an important role in
increasing the lifetime of the network. CHs can ensure the link between
sensors and the Base Station (BS). For a round, if a CHs is dead, the
communications between the sensor nodes in its cluster and the BS are
interrupted and no data information from this cluster can reach the BS. A
sensor node that has a residual energy bigger than a threshold energy
could become a CH for the actual round.
EðSiÞ > βopt  EtoSink (10)
where
βopt ¼ ððrmax  rÞjðrmax  ðEtoSinkjE0ðSi ÞÞÞ (11)
where EðSiÞ is the residual energy of the sensor Si, EtoSink is the necessary
energy for a sensor to transmit a data information to the BS, βopt is the
maximum number of data messages that the sensor Si can send to the BS,
rmax is the maximum number of rounds (that corresponds to the network
lifetime) and r is the actual round.
The proposed set-up phase is illustrated by a ﬂowchart scheme in
Fig. 4.Fig. 2. Energy harvesting for WSN model.
83For each round, the selection of the CHs is based on the location and
residual energy and each non-CH sensor decides to belong the cluster that
corresponds to the minimum distance between its location and the CH
location. Each cluster has its unique CH that can be updated after each
round epochs.
4.2. Steady phase
It corresponds to the data processing, transmitting and receiving be-
tween the sensors in the same cluster. This phase is divided in two stages:
Data information aggregation and entry market game theory for the
communication between neighbors' nodes in the same cluster.
4.2.1. Data information aggregation
To save the maximum amount of energy consuming during sensors
communications and to increase the limited available space in the
memory, the data messages are compressed before their registration in
the sensor's memory.
If we compress a message of LðSiÞ bits to a message of LðSiÞ=a, the
saving energy obtained by compressing the data information can be
expressed as follows:
Esavingi ¼ ½1 1=a:½EP þ ET þ ER  Ecompress (12)
where ECompress is the energy cost to compress LðSiÞ bits data packet
message.
4.2.2. The Game Theory based control
At this stage, we propose a non-cooperative game theory based al-
gorithm to control the energy consumed by the sensors in the network.
This algorithm is called the Proﬁtable Energy Market Game (PEMG)
wherein each player has to decide if he wants to participate or to stay out
of the market at each round. The market deﬁnes trading rules according
to a strategy. In this work, the strategy has two actions: to enter the game
or to stay out the game. Each player (i.e. sensor) calculates a payoff that
can affect or be affected by the payoffs of other players (i.e. its neigh-
bors). The payoff is a function of the sensor's residual energy. More
precisely, the payoffs depend on the players' strategies that stay in the
sleeping mode to charge their batteries or enter the game to transmit the
sensing data messages.
In what follows, a PEMG is deployed within each cluster. The players
in each cluster i are SiðjÞ where j ¼ f1; 2⋯ Nig is the current number of
sensors in the cluster for the round r, miðkÞ denotes the number of mes-
Fig. 4. Flowchart for the set-up phase.
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84sages sent by a given player SiðkÞ,Mj is the number of SiðjÞ neighbors and
UiðjÞ is the individual utility function that will be presented later.
The player SiðjÞ can take one of two decisions denoted by xiðjÞ set to 0
or 1: Entering the game with xiðjÞ ¼ 1 and participate by sending mes-
sages or staying out of the game and harvesting energy to charge its
battery with xiðjÞ ¼ 0: The sensor's decisions can be expressed as follows:
xiðjÞ ¼

1; SiðjÞenters the game
0; SiðjÞstays out the game (13)
In this paper, our game model in each cluster is deﬁned by:
Gi ¼
n
Ni;Mj; XiðjÞjεNi ;UiðjÞjεNi
o
(14)
The utility function for a sensor node depends on the cost of the
strategy decision taken and it can be expressed by:
UiðxiðjÞÞ ¼
8<
:
giðjÞ  CiðjÞ; if xiðjÞ ¼ 0 and 9 xiðkÞ ¼ 1
giðjÞ þ fiðjÞ; if xiðjÞ ¼ 0 for all j 2 Mj
0; if xiðjÞ ¼ 1
(15)
where i 6¼ j , the cost function CiðjÞ is the total energy consumed by SiðjÞ to
send a message, the gain function giðjÞ is its residual energy and fiðjÞ is the
energy harvested to recharge the sensor's battery.
When a sensor player j selects the action to enter the game to transmit
messages and its neighbors sensors not then the utility is giðjÞ CiðjÞ. The
utility is giðjÞ þ fiðjÞ; if the sensor player j decides not to enter the game to
harvest and charge its battery and that, one of its neighbors enters the
game.
In our proposed non-cooperative market entry game, the best
response dynamics for the sensors players can be acquired in the context
that each sensor node updates its strategy in order to maximize its utility,
given the strategy of its neighbors (i.e., a mixed strategy).
To determine a mixed strategy equilibrium, we need to consider the
expected utility of each player. If a randomly node j in the cluster i enters
the market with a probability PiðjÞ, the expected utility of the node j can
be expressed as follows:
E½UiðxiðjÞÞ ¼ PiðjÞ  ðgiðjÞ  CiðjÞÞ þ ð1 PiðjÞÞ  ðgiðjÞ þ fiðjÞÞ

 
1
YMj
k 6¼jð1 PiðkÞÞ
!
(16)
It should be noted this expected utility of node j reaches its maximum
when the battery of the sensor is full (i.e., the residual energy giðjÞ is at its
maximum) and the energy consumption CiðjÞ is 0.
The Figure Fig. 5 shows the variation of the expected utility function
for a given sensor j, with the variation of the number of neighbors be-
tween 1 and 30 and the variation of the probability to enter the game,
e.g., PiðjÞ is between 0.1 and 1. We consider that the neighbors have the
same probability to enter the game PiðkÞ ¼ 0:3, k 6¼ j. Assuming in the
simulation that the maximum energy capacity available is 0.5 j, the result
shown in Fig. 5 shows that the expected utility function has a maximum
which is the maximum energy in the sensor's battery.
Since the best response for a sensor node is when its utility reaches its
maximum, we derive the expected utility function and the derivation is
obtained by:
∂E½UiðxiðjÞjÞ
∂PiðjÞ ¼ ðCiðjÞ þ fiðjÞÞ þ ðgiðjÞ þ fiðjÞÞ 
YMj
k 6¼jð1 PiðkÞÞ (17)
Setting the derivation to zero, we get the maximum as follows:
ðCiðjÞ þ fiðjÞÞ
ðgiðjÞ þ fiðjÞÞ ¼
YMj
k 6¼j
ð1 PiðkÞÞ (18)
Letting αiðjÞ ¼ ðCiðjÞþfiðjÞÞðgiðjÞþfiðjÞÞ and qiðkÞ ¼ ð1 PiðkÞÞ, we obtain a system of
Mj equations from eq. (18) that can be written as:
Fig. 5. The expected utility function varies with the number of nodes neighbors
and the probability PiðjÞ and has a maximum that corresponds to the maximum
battery capacity.
Table 2
Symmetric entering market game matrix.
All SiðkÞ do not enter the
market
At least one enters the
market
SiðjÞ enters the market giðjÞ CiðjÞ giðjÞ CiðjÞ
SiðjÞ doesn't enter the
market
0 giðjÞþ fiðjÞ
S. Kassan et al. Journal of Network and Computer Applications 123 (2018) 80–88>>< αið1Þ ¼ qið2Þ  qið3Þ … qi Mjαið2Þ ¼ qið1Þ  qið3Þ … qiMjTable 3
Simulation parameters.
Parameter value
Network area (m2) 100 100
BS location (50, 50)
Number of sensor nodes n 200
Initial energy (J) E0 0.5
Eelec (nJ/bit) 50
parameters of ampliﬁer energy
consumption Emp (pJ/bit/m4) and Efs (pJ/bit/m2)
0.0013 and 10
Data aggregation energy (J) 5 10–12
Size of data packet (bits) F 4000
Number of bits transmitted by sensor (bits) L 2500
Compression percentage (%) 20
Round epochs rmax 5000, 10000
Proper percentage of CH nodes (%) p 58
>>:
 
⋮
αi

Mj  1
 ¼ qið1Þ … qiMj  2 qiMj
αi

Mj
 ¼ qið1Þ … qiMj  2 qiMj  1
(19)
which can be rewritten as:
 YMj
j¼1ðqiðkÞÞ
!Mj1
¼
YMj
j¼1ðαiðjÞÞ (20)
since qiðkÞ ¼ ð1 PiðkÞÞ, the eq. (20) becomes:
 YMj
j¼1ð1 piðkÞÞ
!Mj1
¼
YMj
j¼1ðαiðjÞÞ (21)
The optimal probability for a given sensor node j in the cluster i to
enter the market game can be then expressed as follows:
PiðjÞ ¼ 1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃQMj
k¼1ðαiðkÞÞMj1
q
αiðjÞ (22)
The maximum utility for a sensor player depends on its strategy and
also on the combination decisions of all other neighbors players.
The utility matrix for sensor player SiðjÞ is shown in Table 2.
For the calculation of the utility matrix for each cluster game, the
resulting utility coming from the combination of the actions taken by the
players (to enter the market game or not to enter the market game) are
taken into consideration as indicated by eq. (15). If a node player j in the
cluster i enters the market, its utility will be ðgiðjÞ  CiðjÞÞ regardless of
the action of its neighbors in this cluster. If none of the nodes in the same
cluster enters the market, this means that all the nodes j and their
neighbors' nodes are out of energy and cannot ﬁnd any available energy
sources to harvest and charge their batteries. For this reason, these sen-
sors receive a payoff equal to 0. It is assumed that ðCiðjÞ < giðjÞÞ, so that at
least a node would enter the market if no other sensor node does.
However, if one node enters the market, then each of its neighbors would
prefer to be selﬁsh and would maximize its residual energy by charging85its battery(see Table 3).
Let X ¼ fxið1Þ;…xiðMjÞg be the vector representation of the strategies
played by the sensors.
The utility matrix for SiðjÞ can be written as follows:
UiðjÞ ¼
	 ðgiðjÞ  CiðjÞÞ ðgiðjÞ  CiðjÞÞ
0 ðgiðjÞ þ fiðjÞÞ


(23)
In a symmetrical market game, the strategy that a sensor player and
its neighbors decide to enter the game market, i.e., X ¼ f1…1g, or the
strategy that a sensor player and its neighbors decide to charge their
battery in the sleeping mode, i.e., X ¼ f0…0g, are not Nash equilibria.
Indeed, it is impossible for each node to ﬁnd out a best response to the
strategy decisions. Namely, no pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium exists in
our game. However, to permit the entry market game to have symmet-
rical Nash equilibria, the players can adopt mixed strategies. For any
node, as ðgiðjÞ  CiðjÞÞ > 0; the sensors players do not have a dominant
strategy. We assumed that each sensor player is allowed to choose its
strategy decisions randomly following a probability distribution. In other
words, there areMj mixed strategies Nash equilibria in the game and the
best responses are obtained when the utility of a node j to enter the
market is equal to the utility of the node j to stay out of the market and
thus we can compute the equilibrium probability from the Table 2 by:
UiðxiðjÞ ¼ 0Þ ¼ UiðxiðjÞ ¼ 1Þ (24)
ðgiðjÞ  CiðjÞÞ  p ¼ ðgiðjÞ þ fiðjÞÞ 

1 ð1 pÞMj1 (25)
Therefore, from the above eq. (25), we can calculate the equilibrium
probability PE to enter the game for a Mj Nash equilibrium with a mixed
strategies as follows:
PEi ðjÞ ¼ 1

1 ðgiðjÞ  CiðjÞÞðgiðjÞ þ fiðjÞÞ
 1
Mj1
(26)
since we have 0 < ðgiðjÞCiðjÞÞðgiðjÞþfiðjÞÞ < 1: Subsequently, from the eq. (26), we can
notice that the probability decreases when the number of neighbors
players increases. For example, in the limiting cases, while ðMj  1Þ is
varying from 1 to inﬁnity, the probability of entering the market game
will be changing from 1 to 0.
Fig. 6 depicts the entering game probability that is given in Eq. (26)Distance (m) D 10
Fig. 6. Entering game probability varies with the number of nodes neighbors
for a Nash Equilibrium mixed strategies.
S. Kassan et al. Journal of Network and Computer Applications 123 (2018) 80–88with increasing number of neighbors of the source, from 1 to 30, for
different values of actual energy in the battery giðjÞ. When the number of
neighbors decreases (from 30 to 1) when some neighbors nodes dead, the
forwarding entering game increases.
5. Simulation results
For our experiments, we used 200 sensor nodes in our network, where
nodes are randomly distributed in 1000 1000 m2 area. The BS is
deployed at the center of the area. For the simulations, a sensor node
considers another sensor as a neighbor if the distance that separate them
is lower than a threshold D. This threshold D is the maximum radius with
which a sensor can receive a ﬁxed number of bits for a ﬁxed power
transmission.
In Fig. 7, we compare the energy consumed by the network for 7000
rounds by comparing our proposed approach with other protocols from
the literature: the LEACH clustering protocol (Xiangning and Yulin,
2007) and a clustering based protocol (Kassan et al., 2018). The results
show that these Leach protocol consumes all its energy after 2000
rounds. An improved version of Leach via a low energy and location
based clustering approach (LELC) presented in (Kassan et al., 2018) stillsFig. 7. Energy Consumption by the network.
86have energy for 5000 rounds. Fig. 7 shows also the results of the two
versions of the proposed PEMG with Game Theory (GT), Popt GT and
Pnash GT, according respectively to Eq. (22) (optimal probability) and
Eq. (26) (Nash equilibrium probability). The either PEMG versions
extend the lifetime of the network beyond 7000 rounds. The results show
also that Popt GT consumes less energy than the PEMG with Nash
probability Pnash GT.
The ﬁgure Fig. 8 shows the evolution of number of dead sensors. For
Leach clustering protocol, the majority of sensor nodes are died before
2000 rounds of time. At the same time, with LELC clustering protocol, the
number of dead sensors is less than the half of the number of dead sensor
nodes in Leach protocol. Moreover, when the WSN is dead, after 5000
rounds, the number of dead nodes is 120. It stills less than the dead nodes
in Leach protocol after 2000 rounds.
In the case of Pnash GT, the number of dead nodes is the half of the
total number after 7000 rounds (i.e., 50%), while in the case of Popt GT
and LELC without GT, 60% of the initial number of sensors are dead. This
is mainly because of our GT based protocols provide the harvesting op-
tion to the sensors. Moreover, with Popt GT, the strategy taken by a
sensor privilege the action to enter the market and thus sending mes-
sages, i.e., maximizing the strategy of communicating messages via Popt
maximization. However, for Pnash GT, all the strategies taken by the
sensor are equally probable.
The simulation results reported in Fig. 9 show that the number of
packets received by the BS for PEMGT with Pnash in our clustering
protocol is more important than all the other approaches and that the
network is still active after 7000 rounds. However, in the case of clus-
tering without any GT, the network lifetime is limited to 5000 rounds. In
addition, the small difference in energy consumed by the network be-
tween Pnash and Popt in PEMGT is justiﬁed by the number of packets
information that reach the BS and the extension of the network lifetime.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, a clustering based protocol using a non-cooperative
game theory (GT) approach is proposed with the aims to prolong WSN
lifetime. The GT permits to a sensor to decide between two actions: to
enter the game and transmit a message or to stay out the game and
harvest to charge its battery. For the network organization, a clustering
protocol based on sensors locations and energy consumptions is used and
a GT based algorithm is deployed within each cluster. The objective is to
ﬁnd out the Nash Equilibrium (NE) solution for mixed strategies. The
simulation results show that the proposed approaches outperforms thoseFig. 8. Dead Nodes in the network.
Fig. 9. Number of Data Packets received by the BS. With Pnash GT, the network
is still active as the packets continue to be received by BS beyond the
other protocols.
S. Kassan et al. Journal of Network and Computer Applications 123 (2018) 80–88without GT in terms of energy consumption, nodes and network life-
times. In other words, combining a GT based approach with a clustering
protocol provides an efﬁcient solution for energy harvesting to prolong
WSNs lifetime. The future work will focus on the control of the energy
harvesting process in the sensors.
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